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ABSTRACT
This study sought to identify incentives that influence the accounting choices for classifying interest and dividends received 
or paid in Cash Flow Statements (CFSs), in the period from 2008 to 2014, in non-financial companies of the Brazilian 
capital market. The hypotheses refer to the effect of the choice of classification for interest and dividends over cash flow 
from operations (CFO), according to indebtedness, profitability, size, negative CFO, sector, and auditor. This article seeks 
to contribute by providing evidence on the accounting choices for classification in CFSs, considering the lack of consensus 
in the results of studies in the Brazilian capital market and helping to better understand these accounting choices and the 
incentives behind them. A correct understanding of the information in CFSs is fundamental for them to be useful to their 
users. The existence of accounting choices for classification in CFSs may directly affect this understanding and, consequently, 
their usefulness. The results help in better understanding the discretion contained in CFSs, enabling the correct use of their 
information. They can also generate evidence for regulatory bodies to rethink their accounting rules and for academia to 
direct future research. Two panel data models were developed, using a sample of 352 companies, 2,290 analyzed reports, and 
3,764 data items. The results indicate that companies with a greater level of debt, profitability, and size make their accounting 
choices in order to report higher CFO in the CFS. The evidence obtained reinforces the international findings and adds new 
analyses in the Brazilian context, contributing to the development of accounting choice theory.
Keywords: Cash Flow Statement, cash flow from operations, accounting choices, classification options.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Choosing means opting, selecting, prefering, electing. 
It is therefore assumed that there are options to be chosen. 
In all branches of knowledge, choices are usually made 
based on criteria and, in the accounting field, this is 
logically no different.
According to Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001, p. 256), 
“accounting choice” is any decision whose main purpose 
is to influence, in form or in substance, the output of the 
accounting system in a particular way. This definition is 
very broad and shows that accounting choices can be 
studied from different perspectives.
In this paper in particular, the object to be studied and 
that enables accounting choices is the Cash Flow Statement 
(CFS). Since the enactment of Law n. 11,638/2007, 
which established the official start of the process of 
convergence of the Brazilian accounting rules toward 
the international rules (International Financial Reporting 
Standards – IFRS), the disclosure of this statement has 
become obligatory in Brazil for financial years ending 
from 2008 onward, the year in which the Accounting 
Pronouncements Committee (Comitê de Pronunciamentos 
Contábeis – CPC) issued Technical Pronouncement 
CPC 03 (Cash Flow Statement) to establish the rules for 
elaboration and disclosure of CFSs.
The “accounting choices” allowed both by the CPC and 
by the IFRS are related to the Options for Classification in 
Cash Flow Statements (OCCFS). Specifically, these choices 
allow interest and dividends received to be classified 
as cash flow from operating activities (CFO) or cash 
flow from investing activities (CFI), while interest and 
dividends paid can be classified as CFO or cash flow from 
financing activities (CFF).
There is also an additional guidance for the Brazilian 
standard (paragraph 34A of CPC 03) that strongly 
encourages (i) the classification of interest, whether 
received or paid, and of dividends received as CFO and 
(ii) dividends paid as CFF. Paragraph 34A is aligned 
with the standard Statement of Cash Flows 95 (SFAS 95), 
originating from the United States Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (USGAAP). The Brazilian standard 
also highlights that, if the guidance is not followed, this 
must be disclosed in a footnote. 
Due to the flexibility for classifying these flows 
(interest and dividends, received or paid) given by the 
standards, preparers can choose where they will present 
the items mentioned and, in the Brazilian context, must 
also disclose proper justifications for that choice, if they 
do not follow the classification “strongly” encouraged 
by CPC 03. Thus, if on one hand this flexibility allows 
for more faithful information to be reported, since the 
presentation of the CFS can be adapted to the specific 
circumstances of each company, on the other hand, this 
same flexibility opens up room for behaviors that may 
be driven by the incentives of individuals or groups 
of individuals preparing the accounting statements, 
by enabling the choice of option that can generate the 
most convenient information for the company. It can 
therefore be assumed that there are incentives that guide 
the accounting choices for classifying in CFSs the items 
that are susceptible to this flexibility. This assumption is 
aligned with the ideas of Watts and Zimmerman (1990), 
who state that accounting is an activity carried out by 
people and, for that reason, no theory can be generated 
that predicts and explains accounting phenomena 
ignoring individuals’ incentives. 
There is no consensus yet based on the empirical 
evidence already obtained on this topic, but there is an 
indication that companies with a higher level of debt, 
at least theoretically, must have incentives to present 
higher amounts of CFO. Lee (2012), analyzing American 
companies, Baik, Cho, Choi, and Lee (2016), observing 
Korean companies, Gordon, Henry, Jorgensen, and 
Linthicum (2017), with a sample of companies from 13 
countries in Europe, and Souza, Pinto, Nunes, and Lemes 
(2019), based on data from the Brazilian market, identified 
this relationship. Other reasons indicated for such choices 
include size, profitability, and growth opportunities. 
However, as already highlighted, the evidence obtained is 
not consistent, which denotes room for continuining this 
type of investigation. Based on this, the central research 
question of this article relates to the incentives that define 
the accounting choices for classification of interest and 
dividends paid or received in the CFSs of companies of 
the Brazilian capital market. 
The research question considers the specific 
characteristics of indebtedness, profitability, size, and 
whether the company has negative CFO from following 
the encouragement of CPC 03 (encouraged CFO), as 
well as general characteristics of the sector to which it 
belongs and the company’s auditor, for the purposes of 
providing indicators of the incentives for these accounting 
choices. So, the general aim of this study is to identify the 
accounting choices for classifying receipts and payments 
of interest and dividends in CFSs and possible drivers of 
these choices. To achieve this objective, the correlation 
between the effect of the option adopted in the CFO 
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and the characteristics of the companies (indebtedness, 
profitability, encouraged CFO, size, sector, and auditor) 
was analyzed.
1.1 Justifications and Contributions
Given the possibility of preparers classifying items 
in the CFS according to CPC 03 and International 
Accounting Standard 7 (IAS 7), and considering that CFO 
is the basis for valuation calculations (Damodaran, 2006), 
which include forecasts of future cash flows for contracting 
(Dichev & Skinner, 2002) and for financial analyses 
(Estridge & Lougee, 2007), there may be various reasons 
for the preparer to choose a particular classification in 
order to obtain advantages. 
This study evaluates whether there are incentives for 
disclosed CFO to be affected, and, in turn, whether this 
information, if not adequately presented, can impair the 
understanding of users regarding the composition of 
cash flows and in determining the company’s value. In 
spite of this, less attention has been paid to variations in 
classification in CFSs (Gordon et al., 2017).
In addition, this paper has the potential to provide 
evidence regarding the discretionary power of managers in 
terms of how they report cash flow measures, when they 
opt for one of the classification alternatives in the CFS, 
which in truth is something that is hardly studied, since 
the income statement is usually the reference measure 
in studies involving earnings management. According to 
Scott (2014, p. 449), accounting profit is formed of CFO, 
adding or subtracting net accruals, which have levels 
of discretion and, for that reason, are the basis of the 
models for measuring the level of earnings management. 
As CFO calculated in accordance with the CPC or IFRS 
is also susceptible to discretion, different CFO measures 
would thus have an impact on the accruals measurement 
and, consequently, on the level of earnings management 
calculated, distorting the findings and comparisons with 
other companies (Maciel, Salotti, & Imoniana, 2017, p. 
198). 
In addition, various models for empirical tests 
involving accounting variables use cash flow measures 
(for example, value relevance, conservatism, and earnings 
management) and the different classifications of receipts 
and payments of interest and dividends can often end up 
altering the results of these models. Therefore, this paper 
has the potential to draw attention to the whole strand 
of academic studies that include these models and use 
those accounting data based on cash flows.
It warrants mentioning that the object question of this 
research has been addressed by various recent studies, 
both at the international level (Baik et al., 2016; Gordon 
et al., 2017; Lee, 2012) and locally (Silva, Martins, & 
Lima, 2018; Souza et al., 2019). These studies, besides 
demonstrating the relevance of the topic, contain samples 
and methodologies that diverge from each other (see Table 
1), as well as not pointing to a consensus in relation to 
the results obtained, which leads to gaps to be explored. 
These studies are discussed in section 2 – Theoretical 
Framework. 
Table 1
Differences identified between the studies regarding accounting choices for classification in Cash Flow Statements (CFSs)
Criterion Silva et al. (2018) Souza et al. (2019) This study
Sample size 112 354 352
Sample profile






Period analyzed 2010 to 2015 (six years) 2010 to 2015 (six years) 2008 to 2014 (seven years)
Variables tested
Indebtedness, profitability, 
negative CFO, company size, 
growth opportunities
Indebtedness, profitability, negative 
CFO, company size, growth 
opportunities
Indebtedness, profitability, CFO 
“encouraged” by CPC 03, company 
size, sector, auditor
Models used
Difference of mean test and 
logistic regression
Logistic regression
Model A: linear regression
Model B: logistic regression
Dependent variable 
of the regressions
Dummy for classification of 
interest paid and dividends 
received
Dummy for classification of cash flows 
(one regression for each classification 
option)
Model A: difference between disclosed 
CFO and encouraged CFO
Model B: dummy for classification of 
interest paid
CPC 03 = Accounting Pronouncements Committee Technical Pronouncement (Cash Flow Statement); CFO = cash flow from 
operations.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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In addition, in Brazil, the inclusion of paragraph 34A 
to CPC 03 configures a particular normative situation 
that has not yet been studied with the focus given by 
this paper, even in the studies involving data from the 
Brazilian market (Silva et al., 2018; Souza et al., 2019), 
thus warranting and differentiating this study.
1.2 Delimitations of the Study
Despite CPC 03 being applicable to entities in general, 
the study does not cover financial institutions, which, 
besides having specific accounting rules, usually classify 
interest, whether paid or received, and dividends received 
as CFO, due to the nature of their operations. This reality 
is mentioned in IAS 7 and in CPC 03, which state that 
there is not a classification consensus for other entities. 
Insurers were also not included in the sample, due to 
them having their own rules and also due to the activity, 
which involves reserving funds to deal with risks and 
claims. These reserved funds generate financial revenues, 
linked to the insurers’ operation. That is, there is no 
variability in the classifications of cash flows of financial 
institutions and insurers, which justifies their exclusion 
from the sample.
In this paper, all mentions of dividends (received 
or paid) also cover interest on own capital (IOC). IOC 
was introduced in Brazil with Law n. 6,404/1976, but it 
was Law n. 9,249/1995 that made the payment of IOC 
deductible (within certain limits) for income tax (IT) 
purposes, which stimulated companies to use these funds 
as profit distribution. In any case, in economic terms, 
IOC is the equivalent of dividends, and for that reason 
has the same accounting treatment (and also the same 
possibility for classification in the CFS – CFO or CFI if 
received IOC, or CFO or CFF if paid IOC).
The research focuses on the consolidated CFS, when 
applicable, of publicly-traded Brazilian companies, since 
in IFRS the presentation of individual statements is not 
required. The individual CFS was only used when there 
were no consolidated statements. Footnotes were not 
consulted, since the focus of the research is on the criterion 
for CFS presentation adopted by Brazilian companies. 
Brazilian companies, of the Brazilian capital market, which 
are public or publicly-traded, are understood as those 
whose stocks are traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange 
– the Brasil Bolsa Balcão (B3) exchange – and regulated 
by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – CVM).
The period analyzed started in 2008, when disclosure 
of CFSs became compulsory in Brazil, and concluded in 
2014, thus covering seven years of data. It is important 
to highlight that the use of various periods enables the 
analysis of different financial and performance situations, 
independently of the factors that would influence such 
changes, whether crises in the economy or in the sector, 
or consequences of internal decisions, for example.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
CFSs, when used in combination with the other 
accounting statements, provide information that 
enables users to evaluate the changes in a company’s 
assets and financial structure. The objective of CFSs is 
to provide information regarding the alterations in an 
entity’s cash flow and cash equivalents accounts, in a 
particular period, classifying these cash flows as cash 
flow from operating (CFO), investing (CFI), or financing 
activities (CFF).
As highlighted in the introduction of this article, 
the information on cash flows generated by the CFS, 
according to IFRS and the CPCs, is prepared based on 
accounting choices regarding the classifications of interest 
and dividends received or paid. Interest and dividends 
received can be classified as CFO or CFI and interest and 
dividends paid can be classified as CFO or CFF. Thus, 
accounting choice theory (if one exists) is applicable to 
this context.
2.1 Accounting Choices
Fields et al. (2001, p. 256) define accounting choice 
as any decision whose primary purpose is to influence, 
in form or in substance, the output of the accounting 
system in a particular way, including not only published 
financial statements, but also tax declarations and 
regulatory records. Cabello and Pereira (2015) state that 
accounting choice theory studies the how and why behind 
choices, since regulatory bodies enable various accounting 
practices for treating the same economic event.
Francis (2001) presents the definition of accounting 
choice according to Fields et al. (2001) and broadens this 
definition by relating it with the nature of that choice, 
which includes, among other forms mentioned by the 
authors: equally accepted rules [e.g. first in, first out (FIFO) 
vs. last in, first out (LIFO)]; judgements and estimates (e.g. 
estimate of useful life of assets); disclosure decisions (e.g. 
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level of details in the description of accounting policies); 
and classification decisions. The latter is the focus of this 
paper, related to accounting choices for classifying receipts 
and payments of interest and dividends in the CFS.
The research on accounting choices aims to identify 
the factors that influence them, considering their 
possible motivations and consequences. According to 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), accounting choices have 
economic consequences if the changes in the rules used 
to calculate the accounting numbers alter the distribution 
of companies’ cash flows or alter the wealth of the parties 
that use these numbers as a basis for defining contracts 
and for decision making. 
Considering the classification decisions that an 
accounting choice can involve, there will not necessarily be 
any alteration in the cash flows effectively distributed and 
in the wealth of the parties involved, due to the changes in 
the accounting numbers disclosed. Taking as a reference 
the theme of this research, the accounting choices in 
CFSs, the object of this study, do not impact the release 
of cash flows, but do interfere in the information on the 
types of cash flows (CFO, CFI, CFF) generated or used 
by the company in the period presented. Thus, it is not 
possible to measure the economic consequences of these 
choices, since they can influence other types of decisions, 
including in subsequent periods.
Accounting choice theory has been discussed for 
decades [see Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990), 
Holthausen (1990), and Watts (1992)] and various 
empirical studies have tested determining factors of such 
choices [see, for example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), 
Holthausen (1990), Missonier-Piera (2004), Quagli and 
Avallone (2010), Martínez, Martínez, and Diazaraque 
(2011), Lorencini and Costa (2012), and Murcia, Souza, 
and Wuergues (2013)].
According to Watts (1992, p. 242), accounting choice 
theory is part of a wider theory, the theory of the firm. This 
author presents the implications of this economic theory 
for accounting choice and clarifies that the existence of 
firms creates a demand for accounting (Watts, 1992, p. 
248). He also reinforces the idea that the accounting 
system performs a role in the contractual agreements 
that accompany the transactions between a company and 
the parties outside the company. Contracts oblige each 
agent (managers, owners, creditors, employees, clients, 
suppliers, auditors, and government) to contribute with 
resources to the organization (Sunder, 1997, p. 15).
For Sunder (1997, p. 14), in the understanding of 
accounting, the firm can be seen as a set of contracts, 
whether explicit or implicit, between rational agents, who 
according to the constraints on their opportunities and 
information, do not consciously choose less desirable 
courses of action over more desirable ones. This reinforces 
the complexity that can be involved in accounting choices, 
considering the discretion that managers have when 
deciding the set of accounting procedures that will be used.
In the following section, the main previous studies 
related to accounting choices and cash flow measures 
are described.
2.2 Previous Studies on Choices for 
Classification in CFSs
Lee (2012) studied incentives to inflate CFO in CFSs 
using classification and timing in companies from the 
United States of America in the period from 1988 to 2008. 
This study observed what it called CFO management 
(CFOM), which is different from earnings management, 
as indicated by the author. CFOM does not affect the 
result for the period, that is, this remains constant, as well 
as the aggregate cash flow, which is the sum of the cash 
flows from operating, investing, and financing activities. 
One of the characteristics identified by Lee (2012) to 
inflate CFO in the CFS was the bankruptcy probability 
of companies, which indicates there being incentives for 
the classifications in the CFS.
Baik et al. (2016) examined the changes in CFS 
classifications in companies that adopted IFRS in Korea, 
specifically the determining factors and economic 
consequences of a change in classification of interest paid. 
It was observed that companies with high indebtedness 
and a concentrated ownership structure tend to reclassify 
the amount of interest paid from operating activity to 
financing activity, thus increasing the value of the CFO 
disclosed.
Gordon et al. (2017) studied the flexibility in the choice 
of CFS classification according to IFRS in companies 
from 13 European countries, for financial years between 
2005 and 2008, and identified determining factors for 
classification choices that increase CFO related to company 
characteristics, including profitability and debt. The authors 
mention the effect of the flexibility of CFS classifications 
using, as a reference, SFAS 95, which establishes the 
classification of interest and dividends in a similar way to 
that encouraged by CPC 03, in paragraph 34A.
In Brazil, the debate involving the elaboration and 
disclosure of CFSs was primarily developed in the 1990s, 
since the substitution of the Statement of Origins and 
Applications of Resources (Demonstração das Origens e 
Aplicações de Recursos – Doar) by the CFS was already 
being considered at that time, which in fact only occurred 
as of 2008, following the alteration in the corporate act 
that occurred in 2007. Various academic and technical 
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papers have been developed based on this discussion and, 
specifically in relation to accounting choices, two studies 
by Santos and Lustosa, from 1999 and 2000, warrant 
attention. In these two papers, published in the journal 
Temática Contábil e Balanços (Accounting and Balance 
Sheets), by Informações Objetivas e Publicações Jurídicas 
(IOB) (Objective Information and Legal Publications), 
the authors discussed in depth the options for classifying 
interest and dividends paid (in the first article) and 
received (in the second) and, at the end, suggested that, 
technically, interest and dividends paid should be classified 
in financing activity and interest and dividends received 
should be classified in investing activity. This suggestion, 
if embraced, would have eliminated the possibility of 
accounting choices and, consequently, the possible 
opportunistic behaviors of the preparers of financial 
statements. However, this did not occur, since, as already 
highlighted in the Introduction, Brazil essentially adopted 
the IASB model, which enables such choices.
Subsequently to this debate and in the face of the 
definitive adoption of the CFS in Brazil, Silva et al. (2018) 
investigated the accounting choices in CFS disclosure, in 
the period from 2010 to 2015, of the companies listed on 
the New Market (Novo Mercado) of the São Paulo Stock, 
Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA), 
which establishes a higher standard of corporate 
governance, with a total sample of 112 companies. 
In line with the present research, they considered the 
classification of interest and dividends, paid and received, 
with the aim of identifying factors that explained these 
choices. They analyzed aspects related to debt, profitability, 
negative CFO, company size, and growth opportunities 
as incentives for choices that increase CFO. The results 
of the research by Silva et al. (2018) did not present 
conclusive evidence that the accounting choices in the 
CFSs were related to debt, profitability, or negative CFO. 
In contrast, they partially accepted the company size and 
growth opportunities hypotheses. The authors indicate 
that the results obtained are not consistent with previous 
studies, probably due to implications of other variables not 
analyzed by them. In addition, it should be highlighted 
that the sample studied by Silva et al. (2018) is restricted to 
companies of the New Market, thus limiting the findings.
Another study with data from the Brazilian market was 
developed by Souza et al. (2019). The aim of that research 
was to identify the level of comparability of the accounting 
choices related to the CFS and factors that could explain 
such choices. A sample of 354 non-financial publicly-
traded companies was chosen, covering the period from 
2010 to 2015, and the choices relating to interest and 
dividends received and paid were analyzed, along with 
IT paid. The variables tested considered the company’s 
size, level of debt, profitability, growth opportunities, and 
negative CFO. All the hypotheses were confirmed, to a 
greater or lesser extent, suggesting that the companies of 
the Brazilian market use accounting choices to manage 
cash flows.
Therefore, the empirical evidence related to the 
accounting choices for classifying cash flows in the CFS 
are still not conclusive, which suggests more empirical 
investigation. In any case, they appear to indicate the 
existence of incentives for the classification of cash flows 
in the CFS, especially with relation to the indebtedness 
variable, which showed greater empirical consistency in 
the findings. In the next section, the hypotheses of this 
study are constructed and underpinned.
2.3 Development of the Hypotheses
The research question guiding this study covers 
incentives that define the accounting choices for classifying 
interest and dividends paid or received in the CFSs of 
companies of the Brazilian capital market. Thus, in order 
to answer this question, four hypotheses are developed, 
described, and underpinned below.
2.3.1 Indebtedness
If a company has a high level of debt, this may indicate 
a situation of financial difficulty. Thus, there is naturally 
an incentive for that company to want to report a higher 
CFO, since this could indicate to current and potential 
interested parties (creditors and investors) that the entity 
would be able to meet its financial commitments and 
would not enter into a bankruptcy situation.
The studies described in section 2.2 tested this 
reasoning. Lee (2012) documented the existence of a 
relationship between the CFS classifications and the 
bankruptcy probability. Baik et al. (2016) observed a 
positive relationship between Korean firms with higher 
indebtedness and changes in the classification of interest 
paid from CFO to FCF. Gordon et al. (2017) reached the 
same conclusion on this, also mentioning that companies 
that have contracts and costs involved in renegotiations 
seek to report a higher CFO. Silva et al. (2018) and Souza 
et al. (2019) also tested the relationship between the level 
of debt and choices in the CFS, and only Souza et al. 
(2019) identified a correlation.
Thus, the following hypothesis was developed:
H1: companies with a high level of debt tend to choose the 
classification that increases CFO.
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2.3.2 Profitability
Based on the previous hypothesis, assuming that “bad 
news” would incentivize an accounting choice to improve 
the CFO, then it can be expected that a company with 
higher profitability would be less likely to manage an 
increase in CFO, since it has a positive situation in its 
favor. However, despite agreeing with this idea, Gordon 
et al. (2017) also counter it, by assuming that a more 
lucrative company could be motivated to present a higher 
CFO to show consistency between income generation and 
cash flow. Silva et al. (2018) also support this argument, 
although they recognize that companies with negative 
CFO have incentives for classifications that make it less 
negative or even positive.
For the purposes of this work, the first line of reasoning 
is sustained, in order to maintain consistency with H1 and 
with the argument that companies tend to present more 
favorable information as an attempt to compensate for 
some unsatisfactory situation, which in this case would 
be lower profitability.
Thus, the following hypothesis is elaborated:
H2: companies with lower profitability tend to choose the 
classification that increases CFO.
2.3.3 Effects of the “encouragement” of CPC 03
As described in the introduction of this article, CPC 03 
introduced paragraph 34A (non-existent in the respective 
standard IAS 7), which strongly encourages entities to 
classify interest and dividends received and interest paid 
as CFO and dividends paid as CFF. Based on this, it was 
considered that companies that would report negative 
CFO, following the encouragement of CPC 03, have 
incentives to attenuate this situation or even invert it. 
For that reason, it is expected that if the encouraged 
CFO is negative, the greater the chance is of managing an 
increase in the CFO disclosed. Despite the previous studies 
analyzed not using this characteristic, it was developed 
by analogy to the cases involving incentives to report 
positive results instead of negative ones, according to 
the research of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Thus, the 
third hypothesis was developed:
H3: companies with negative CFO in accordance with the 
encouragement of CPC 03 tend to choose the classification that 
increases CFO.
2.3.4 Size
The size of companies is a characteristic that can 
affect the classification choices in the CFS, since the 
bigger the company, the more incentives there are to 
present a higher CFO. This incentive may be linked to 
the political visibility of the company; that is, as they 
have more visibility, bigger firms may feel pressured 
to choose cash flow classifications that increase CFO. 
Watts (1992) suggests that the political process affects 
accounting choices.
Silva et al. (2018) and Souza et al. (2019) tested this 
variable in their studies and found indications that the 
company’s size has an impact on the accounting choices 
for classification in CFSs.
Lee (2012), Baik et al. (2016), and Gordon et al. (2017) 
also include this variable in the models, however as a 
control variable. In spite of this, it is understood that the 
political visibility argument is consistent and warrants 
the inclusion of size as an explanatory variable.
Thus, the fourth hypothesis was raised:
H4: bigger companies tend to choose the classification that increases 
CFO.
2.3.5 Control variables: sector and auditor
There are no hypotheses regarding the variables related 
to the sector and auditor of the companies, since there is 
no specific expected effect on CFO due to these general 
characteristics. However, considering that companies’ 
characteristics can be influenced by the sector in which 
they operate and the auditing firm that audits them, 
these variables were considered in the model as control 
variables; that is, by including these variables in the model, 
it is possible to evaluate the incremental effect of the 
other variables.
Having developed and underpinned the hypotheses, 
the next section describes the methodological procedures.
3. METHODOLOGY
The analysis of the gathered data and their relationships 
enables it to be evaluated whether there are incentives for 
the CFO to be affected through the choice of classification 
of interest and dividends. The motives for adopting a 
particular accounting practice and changing them is the 
object of positive accounting research. 
The values of total assets, CFO, return on assets, 
and indebtedness, as well as the Corporate Taxpayers’ 
Flávia Fonte de Souza Maciel, Bruno Meirelles Salotti & Joshua Onome Imoniana
251R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 83, p. 244-261, May/Aug. 2020
Registration (Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica – 
CNPJ) of the companies chosen, were obtained from the 
Economatica® database. These financial and accounting 
data considered consolidated values from the 12-month 
period ending on December 31st. The CFSs were extracted 
from the Full Annual Financial Statements (annual FSs), 
held on the website of the CVM (the regulatory body for 
the Brazilian capital market), after searching by CNPJ.
Only cases with an explicit indication in the CFS of 
interest and dividends, whether paid or received, were 
included in the database, independently of the motive 
for not presenting this information, whether it was not 
applicable or because it did not feature. Another criterion 
adopted concerns the cases in which in the financial year 
there were no values for the items under analysis, but there 
was CFS information because there was an amount from 
the previous comparative period, so the classification of 
the financial year in question was tabulated and indicated 
with a 0 value.
The list of companies for analysis of the respective data 
was taken from the Economatica® database. The filters of 
Brazil as the host country, company with an active status, 
and the most traded stock were used in order to avoid 
repetition of companies. The industry segments filter 
was also used and the companies classified as “Finance 
and Insurance” and “Funds” were excluded from the 
database, since financial institutions do not form part 
of the scope of the research. Therefore, 352 companies 
were initially selected.
Next, the annual FSs from 2008 to 2014 of these 
companies were obtained. Companies with an accounting 
year ending in other periods that were not December 31st 
were excluded, given that the financial and accounting 
data collected were from this base date.
Data with inconsistencies (e.g. positive interest paid, 
negative dividends received, etc.) were also excluded 
from the sample, as well as cases in which the CFS was 
not presented, was not legible (low quality of scanned 
copy), or missing some part (second page of the CFS). 
Appendix A details the periods and companies with such 
occurrences.
Table 2 presents the reconciliation of the difference 
between the predicted quantity of annual FSs that would 
be analyzed, if the 352 companies chosen had disclosure in 
all the financial years, and the final quantity actually used 
in the research. This difference is the result of annual FSs 
that were not disclosed, due to the company only having 
disclosed financial statements in some of the years.
Table 2 
Reconciliation of the quantity of Annual Financial Statements (FSs)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Predicted annual FSs of the chosen companies 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 2,464
Exclusions
Other accounting years -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -4 -4 -26
Inconsistencies in the data -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -1 -12
CFS not presented, illegible, or incomplete -1 -3 -1 -2 -7
Annual FSs not disclosed - 41 - 32 -21 -14 -3 -1 -17 -129
Annual CFs used in the research 308 314 327 329 340 342 330 2,290
CFS = Cash Flows Statement.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Via the analysis of the CFSs featuring in the 2,290 
annual FSs, the data were collected relating to the 
companies’ interest and dividends cash flows. Table 3 
provides a summary of the quantity of data gathered 
through that analysis, considering that each annual FS may 
have from zero to four collected data items, depending on 
the items (interest paid, interest received, dividends paid, 
and dividends received) that feature in the respective CFS.
Table 3 
Summary of the data collected (by year)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Interest paid 94 117 162 177 194 200 201 1,145
Interest received 9 13 15 16 16 15 13 97
Dividends paid 189 198 217 220 228 233 232 1,517
Dividends received 111 124 134 147 158 169 162 1,005
Total data collected 403 452 528 560 596 617 608 3,764
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Incentives for accounting choices in Cash Flows Statements
252 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 83, p. 244-261, May/Aug. 2020
The data indicated in Table 3 were used to direct the 
research hypotheses. The exception occurs for the data 
indicated on the first line of that table, since of the total 
of 1,145 data items regarding interest paid, four were 
excluded from the database to run the regression that has 
interest paid as the dependent variable (model B), resulting 
in 1,141 used data items. The excluded data refer to the 
company Dommo Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A., 
whose profitability and debt indices distort the descriptive 
analyses as they are too high. In 2011, for example, this 
company had a net loss of R$ 6,043,625.00, total assets 
of R$ 61,119.00, and total liabilities of R$ 9,048,644.00, 
resulting in profitability and debt indices of 4,168% and 
6,240%, respectively, when the mean for the period was 
from 4% to 61% (excluding that company). Except for 
the exclusion of the data from that company, no other 
treatment was needed for outliers.
With the aim of reaching a conclusion regarding 
the rejection or not of the hypotheses, two dependent 
variables were considered for the analysis of the effect 
on CFO derived from the choice of classification: (i) the 
difference in reais between the disclosed CFO and the 
value that the CFO would be from following the options 
encouraged by CPC 03 (encouraged CFO) and (ii) the 
choice of classification for interest paid. The first variable 
was divided by the value of total assets, in order to exclude 
the effect of any possible variability due to the company’s 
size. The analysis of the second dependent variable, using 
logistic regression, was directed at interest paid, since 
if it is classified in the CFS as CFF (without following 
the classification recommended by the CPC), this will 
result in an improvement in cash flows from operating 
activities; the opposite occurs if it is classified as CFO. This 
improvement, from not following the recommendation 
of the CPC, does not occur with the other alternatives 
(interest received, dividends received and paid). This 
targetting was elaborated based on the research of Gordon 
et al. (2017).
Finally, the relationship between the dependent and 
explanatory variables was analyzed using panel data. This 
relationship is presented in Table 4, which also indicates the 
proxies used and the expected effect on CFO of each one.
Table 4
Models and variables of the hypotheses
Model Dependent variable Explanatory variables Proxies Expected effect on CFO
A
Difference in reais between the 
disclosed CFO and encouraged CFO 
divided by the value of total assets
Indebtedness*
General indebtedness (total 
liabilities/total assets x 100)
+
Profitability




Choice of classification for interest 
paid (dummy, 1 for classification as 
CFF and 0 for CFO)
Encouraged CFO
CFO in accordance with 
encouragement of CPC 03 (dummy, 
1 if negative and 0 if positive)
+
Size Natural logarithm of total assets +
CPC 03 = Accounting Pronouncements Committee Technical Pronouncement (Cash Flow Statement); CFF = cash flow from 
financing activities; CFO = cash flow from operating activities.
* = another debt index was considered in the regressions (total loans and financing divided by assets), but it did not generate 
divergent results; + = positive; - = negative.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
As commented in the development of the hypotheses 
(section 2.3), the expected effect on CFO is related to the 
company’s need to present more favorable information in 
order to compensate for some unsatisfactory situation. 
For this reason, the more indebted the company is, or 
the less profitable it is, or if it has a negative encouraged 
CFO, the more the classification options are expected 
to be used to increase the amount of CFO presented. 
Regarding size, the existence of incentives for favorable 
reports is considered in bigger companies.
When determining the sectors, the sector classification 
of Economatica® was used, composed of: Agriculture 
and fishing; Food and drink; Commerce; Construction; 
Electro domestics; Electrical energy; Industrial 
machinery; Mining; Non-metal minerals; Pulp and 
paper; Oil and gas; Chemicals; Steel and metal; Software 
and data; Telecommunications; Textiles; Transport – 
Services; Vehicles and parts; and Others, totaling 19 
sectors. Finally, five groups of independent auditors were 
considered: four are composed of each one of the Big 
Four and another group is formed of the other auditing 
firms. This grouping enables the identification of the 
similarities and differences of treatment of each one 
of the Big Four and the other auditors with respect to 
their agreement regarding the classification in the CFS 
of interest, dividends, and IOC.
The panel data analysis covers two dimensions: one 
cross-sectional, represented by the companies, and one 
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longitudinal, represented by time. Thus, information 
from more than one individual was obtained over one 
time period. The use of panel data also enables the use of 
a greater number of observations than would be possible 
if only cross-sectional or only longitudinal data were used 
(Baltagi, 1998, cited by Gujarati, 2006). In this study, the 
individuals are represented by 171 companies in model 
A and 234 companies in model B, observed over seven 
years, involving an unbalanced panel, since there are 
companies with data in only some years.
Finally, it warrants mentioning that this study has 
methodological differences in relation to those of Silva et 
al. (2018) and Souza et al. (2019). Table 1 summarizes these 
differences and, from its analysis, it is noted that this study 
considers a longer period in relation to the previous ones 
and has as differentials the analysis of the “encouragement” 
of CPC 03 and the inclusion of the sector and auditor control 
variables. In addition, the use of two regression models 
together with these differentials may capture a relationship 
between the variables that the previous studies did not. 
4. RESULTS
This section presents the results of the regressions, 
separating the two regression models used. As previously 
indicated in Table 4, model A has “difference” as the 
dependent variable, which represents the difference in 
reais between the CFO disclosed and the value that the CFO 
would be from following the options encouraged by CPC 
03 (encouraged CFO) divided by the value of total assets. 
Model B has “interest paid” as the dependent variable, 
which refers to the choice of classification for interest paid 
– a dummy variable that is 1 for classification as CFF and 
0 if CFO. The explanatory variables (debt, profitability, 
encouraged CFO, and size) and the control variables (sector 
and auditor) are the same in the two models.
The descriptive analyses of each model, using the 
mean, frequency, standard deviation, and median, are 
presented in appendices B and C.
Each regression was tested using the fixed effects 
model and the random effects model. All the models 
were estimated considering the inclusion of six dummy 
variables corresponding to the years studied. Six variables 
were included (and not seven, from 2008 to 2014), to avoid 
the problem of multicollinearity, and the Wald test was 
used to verify the relevance of those variables in the model. 
The aim of this test is to verify whether the parameters 
of the dummy variables are together equal to 0, which 
would indicate there being no statistical importance to 
keep them in the model.
The significance from the Wald test resulted in a 
value greater than 0.05 in all cases, indicating that the 
parameters of the dummy variables are together equal to 
0 and, therefore, should be excluded from the model. That 
is, these variables were not able to capture macroeconomic 
factors that could have affected the companies in the 
period analyzed. This indicates that in no year was there 
discordant behavior compared to the others, which may 
be related to relevant external factors from a particular 
year, such as a serious crisis or specific economic events.
All the models were also estimated considering the 
classification of the auditors into two groups (“Big Four” 
vs. others), not resulting in different conclusions from 
the five groups (each one of the “Big Four” and others) 
considered.
4.1 Model A
To carry out the regression, only the periods of the 
companies in which there was a difference between the 
amount of CFO disclosed and the encouraged CFO were 
considered, resulting in the use of 171 companies and 
585 data items.
To evaluate which of the models (fixed effects or 
random effects) is the most adequate, two tests were 
used: the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (Breusch-
Pagan test) and the Hausman test. Their results can be 
found in Table 5.
Table 5
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests (model A)
Breusch-Pagan Test Hausman Test
H0 Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 The estimates of the random effects model are consistent.
Chi-squared 48.4693 86.4456
p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Conclusion The pooled model is rejected
The random effects model is rejected, so the applicable 
model is the fixed effects one.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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As the significance (p-value) of the Breusch-Pagan 
test was lower than 0.05, it is concluded that between the 
pooled model and the random effects model, the random 
effects one is the most adequate. Using the Hausman 
test, the most adequate model between fixed effects and 
random effects is evaluated, concluding that the best one 
is the fixed effects model, since the p-value of this test was 
lower than 0.05, that is, it was significant (Gujarati, 2006).
Model A was estimated according to the equation 
below:
Differencei,t = β0 + β1 Debti,t + β2 Profi,t + 
β3 CFOi,t + β4 Sizei,t + β5 Secti + β6 Audi,t + ε
in which Differencei,t is the difference in reais (of company 
i in year t) between the CFO disclosed in the CFS and the 
“encouraged CFO”, which is the CFO value constructed 
by following the classifications in the CFS encouraged 
by CPC 03, divided by the value of total assets on 
December 31st of year t, β0 is the constant, β1, β2, β3, β4, 
β5, β6 are the coefficients of the equation, Debti,t is the 
general indebtedness (of company i in year t), calculated 
by the division between total liabilities and total assets 
on December 31st of year t, Profi,t is the profitability (of 
company i in year t), calculated by the division between 
the net income of year t and the total assets on December 
31st of year t, CFOi,t is the encouraged CFO (of company 
i in year t), a dummy variable, which is 1 if the CFO is 
negative and 0 if it is positive, Sizei,t is the size (of company 
i in year t), calculated based on the natural logarithm of 
the total assets on December 31st of year t, Secti is the 
sector of company i based on the sector classification of 
Economatica®, Audi,t is the auditor (of company i) related 
to the financial statements (for year t), and ε is the error 
term of the model.
Table 6 shows the data from the regression and the 
coefficients obtained, using the fixed effects model, defined 
based on the Hausman test for model A.
Table 6
Summary of the coefficients of model A (fixed effects)
Coefficients Standard error t p-value
Constant -0.976873 0.102748 -9.508 < 0.001***
Debt 0.000306906 0.000152498 2.013 0.0448**
Profitability 4.82271 × 10-5 8.68074 × 10-6 5.556 < 0.001***
CFO 0.00831131 0.0078285 1.062 0.2890
Size 0.0660726 0.00705278 -0.5224 < 0.001***
Sector Variable excluded from the model due to the exact collinearity
Auditor 0.000346343 0.00272688 0.1270 0.8990
Data Quantity/value
Cross section 171 units





CFO = cash flow from operating activities.
** = p-value < 0.05; *** = p-value < 0.01. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
From Table 6, it can be seen that the debt, profitability, 
and size variables have a significant coefficient, that is, 
p-value < 0.05 (Gujarati, 2006), directly influencing 
(positive coefficient) the difference in reais between the 
disclosed CFO and the CFO encouraged by CPC 03; 
that is, the greater the debt, profitability, and size, the 
greater the difference. In addition, the random effects 
model, although it is not the most adequate according 
to the results of the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests 
presented in Table 5, generates results that confirm the 
significance of the debt and size variables, obtained via 
the fixed effects model.
Therefore, based on model A, only H3 was rejected, 
related to the calculation of a negative CFO following 
the encouragement of CPC 03. The results appear to 
indicate that more indebted companies may be using their 
accounting choices in the CFS to disclose a more favorable 
CFO. Gordon et al. (2017) identified debt (positive 
correlation) and profitability (negative correlation) as 
significant variables influencing the difference between 
the disclosed CFO and the value that the CFO would be 
1
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following the U.S. standard SFAS 95, which considers 
the same classifications encouraged by CPC 03. Table 6 
indicates that more profitable companies tend to present a 
higher CFO (positive correlation), the opposite behavior 
from what was expected for this hypothesis and from the 
behavior identified by Gordon et al. (2017). On the other 
hand, the results indicate that the bigger the company, 
the greater the CFO presented, which may be related 
to internal incentives for favorable reports. The size 
variable was not significant in the research of Gordon 
et al. (2017). Regarding the control variables related to 
the sector and auditor, the results did not indicate any 
significant relationship, similarly to the study by Gordon 
et al. (2017).
The studies with data from the Brazilian market, 
despite using data models that are not directly comparable 
with this research (as presented in Table 1), obtained some 
different results. Silva et al. (2018) obtained significance 
only for the size and growth opportunities variables 
(the latter was not tested in this article), which was not 
identified for the debt and profitability variables. Souza et 
al. (2019) obtained significance in all the variables tested, 
including the size, debt, and profitability variables with 
a direct correlation, similarly to this study. Logically, the 
methodological differences may explain the disparity of 
the findings.
4.2 Model B
To carry out the regression of model B, only the 
periods of the companies in which there was disclosure 
of interest paid were considered, resulting in the use of 
234 companies and 1,141 data items.
To evaluate which of the models (fixed effects or 
random effects) is the most adequate, two tests were 
used: the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (Breusch-
Pagan test) and the Hausman test. Their results can be 
found in Table 7.
Table 7 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests (model B)
Breusch-Pagan Test Hausman Test
H0 Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 The estimates of the random effects model are consistent
Chi-squared 1,463.52 2.57057
p-value 0 0.765832
Conclusion The pooled model is rejected The random effects model is accepted
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
As the significance (p-value) of the Breusch-Pagan 
test was lower than 0.05, it is concluded that between 
the pooled model and the random effects model, the 
random effects one is the most adequate. This conclusion 
is corroborated by the Hausman test, since the p-value of 
this test was greater than 0.05; that is, it was not significant. 
Therefore, the best one is the random effects model, since 
H0 was not rejected.
Model B was estimated according to the equation 
below:
Interest paidi,t = β0 + β1 Debti,t + β2 Profi,t + 
β3 CFOi,t + β4 Sizei,t + β5 Secti + β6 Audi,t + ε
in which Interest paidi,t is the choice of classification 
for interest paid in the CFS of company i in year t 
(dummy variable, which is 1 if the interest paid was 
classified as CFF and 0 if CFO), β0 is the constant, β1, 
β2, β3, β4, β5, β6 are the coefficients of the equation, Debti,t 
is the general indebtedness (of company i in year t), 
calculated by the division between total liabilities and 
total assets on December 31st of year t, Profi,t is the 
profitability (of company i in year t), calculated by the 
division between the net income of year t and the total 
assets on December 31st of year t, CFOi,t is the encouraged 
CFO (of company i in year t), a dummy variable, which 
is 1 if the CFO is negative and 0 if it is positive, Sizei,t 
is the size (of company i in year t), calculated based on 
the natural logarithm of total assets on December 31st 
of year t, Secti is the sector of company i based on the 
sector classification of Economatica®, and Audi,t is the 
auditor (of company i) related to the financial statements 
(for year t).
Table 8 shows the data from the regression and the 
coefficients obtained using the random effects model 
for model B.
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Table 8
Summary and coefficients of model B (random effects)
Coefficients Standard error T p-value
Constant 0.493560 0.227227 2.172 0.0298**
Debt 0.000865479 0.000322472 2.684 0.0073***
Profitability 4.00130 × 10-6 3.44762 × 10-5 0.1161 0.9076
CFO 0.0109755 0.0235966 0.4651 0.6418
Size -0.0112590 0.0135501 -0.8309 0.4060
Sector 0.00251283 0.00502041 0.5005 0.6167
Auditor -0.00748195 0.00716119 -1.045 0.2961
Data Quantity/value
Cross section 234 units
Time series Minimum of 1/maximum of 7
“Within” the variance 0.0528398
“Between” the variance 0.191822
Standard error 0.483454
CFO = cash flow from operating activities.
** = p-value < 0.05; *** = p-value < 0.01.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
From Table 8, it can be seen that only the debt variable 
has a significant coefficient (p-value < 0.05), indicating 
there is a direct relationship between indebtedness and 
the classification of interest paid as CFF, which, in turn, 
generates an increase in the disclosed CFO. Using the 
same comparison made in model A, these results were 
compared with those obtained by the fixed effects model, 
although that one is not the most adequate, according 
to the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests presented in 
Table 7. The results confirm the statistical significance 
of the debt variable.
As in model A, this result is in accordance with the 
expected effect (Table 4) and consistent with the one 
presented by Gordon et al. (2017), in which again they 
identified the debt variable as significant in another model 
that used the classification of interest paid in the CFSs of 
a sample of European companies.
Baik et al. (2016) identified that Korean firms 
with higher debt and a bigger size tend to change the 
classification of interest paid from CFO to CFF, revealing 
that these characteristics are incentives for disclosing a 
better CFO. However, variables related to profitability were 
not statistically significant. Variables related to sector and 
the auditor were not used in the aforementioned research.
The tests in the study by Silva et al. (2018), which 
considered the debt, profitability, negative CFO, size, and 
growth opportunities variables in its logistic regression 
model with the choice of classification for interest paid 
as the dependent variable, presented significance only 
for the size variable. This divergence may be influenced 
by the difference in the samples and periods studied. For 
the regression of interest paid, the research of Souza et 
al. (2019) presented the same result documented here: 
significance of the debt variable. 
Again, based on model B, H1 was not rejected. 
Therefore, from different perspectives (models A and 
B) and as also documented by a large portion of the other 
studies on this topic, the debt variable showed a positive 
and statistically significant relationship, indicating that 
this is a possible incentive for the accounting choices for 
classification of interest and dividends paid or received 
in the CFSs of companies of the Brazilian capital market.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The possibility of choosing one classification in the CFS 
from various relates to the incentives that determine that 
accounting choice. In general, the incentives identified 
in this research in the context of the Brazilian capital 
market relate to the financial situation (indebtedness and 
profitability) and to the size of the companies.
The results of the regressions showed that indebtedness 
influences the difference between the disclosed CFO and 
the value that the CFO would be if the options encouraged 
by CPC 03 were followed, as well as the classification 
of interest paid as CFF. They identified that the greater 
the indebtedness, the greater the difference, that is, the 
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greater the value of the disclosed CFO in relation to the 
CFO encouraged by CPC 03, and that there is a direct 
relationship (positive coefficient) between indebtedness 
and the classification of interest paid as CFC. This behavior 
may indicate that companies with an unfavorable financial 
situation tend to choose the classification that increases 
CFO. Thus, hypothesis H1 was not rejected.
The profitability variable was significant, which 
reveals that more profitable companies tend to choose 
the classification that increases CFO, this perhaps being 
a way of reinforcing their favorable situation, which is 
the direct opposite of H2, which considered that this 
tendency occurred in less profitable companies. H3 was 
rejected, since the negative CFO variable in accordance 
with the encouragement of CPC 03 was not significant in 
the results of the regressions. And the non-rejection of H4 
reveals that the bigger the company, the greater the CFO 
presented, which may be related to internal incentives 
for favorable reports.
Despite the study being limited to some variables, these 
results present contributions, both to the consolidation of 
theories and to the set of empirical studies related to the 
topic and also to the improvement of accounting practice.
The contribution related to accounting choice theory 
and its empirical evidence involves the identification of 
evidence and indications of incentives that direct the 
choice of classifications in CFSs in the Brazilian setting. 
Despite there being empirical studies on this topic in 
Brazil (Silva et al., 2018; Souza et al., 2019), there are 
important differences, such as the extension of the 
period studied, the inclusion of control variables, and 
tests using two models. In addition, some of the results 
obtained here are consistent with the findings obtained in 
other international studies, especially those of Baik et al. 
(2016) and Gordon et al. (2017), which corroborate the 
conclusions that the level of indebtedness indeed appears 
to influence the accounting choices for classifying interest 
and dividends received or paid in CFSs. Thus, this study 
brings scientific implications to this field of knowledge, 
in that it confirms, with comprehensive data from the 
Brazilian market, what accounting choice theory predicts: 
choices are induced by economic incentives, such as 
indebtedness and profitability.
This study provides differentiated contributions 
by considering the “encouraged CFO” variable – if 
the company has negative CFO from following the 
encouragement of CPC 03 – not used by other research 
and by using the “sector” and “auditor” control variables 
in the Brazilian context.
For financial information users, knowing the choices 
and factors related to the classification of interest and 
dividends in CFSs helps in correctly analyzing these 
statements, and the other ones in combination. In the 
case of investors and creditors, who are aware of the use 
of this discretion and of the incentives that can affect CFO, 
they can make adjustments and use the adequate measure 
of CFO to estimate future cash flows, whether for the 
purposes of evaluating companies or financial analyses.
Understanding the discretion involved in CFSs, besides 
enabling an adequate comparison between companies, 
enables the alignment of the CFO measurement so that the 
subsequent accruals measurement is made correctly, when 
wanting to determine the level of earnings management. 
Another implication of this study refers to its relevance for 
standard setters, who can issue and/or revise accounting 
standards in response to the CFS choices that Brazilian 
companies have made and their impact.
In addition, this paper enables an understanding 
regarding the additional recommendations of the CPC 
in relation to IFRS, in an attempt to standardize the 
presentation of CFSs, as occurs in USGAAP. The results 
appear to indicate that this recommendation has not had 
an effect when there has been interest in a more favorable 
presentation of cash flows. Aware of this scenario, standard 
setters could evaluate up to what point it is beneficial to 
enable or not flexibility in CFS classifications. It is possible 
to perceive that the IASB has limited choices in other 
areas of accounting (such as, for example, the accounting 
of joint arrangements, financial instruments, and lease 
operations, among others). The evidence provided here 
may indicate the same path for CFSs.
Finally, when the use of the flexibility of CFS 
classifications is mentioned as supporting possible 
opportunistic behavior, this concerns the search for 
evidence of, for example, specific situations, such as the 
level of indebtedness, profitability, and size, which are 
factors identified in this study. Yet, it is not possible to 
state that, in all the cases with such evidence identified, 
the freedom of choice was used to generate the most 
convenient information. This impossibility occurs since 
there may be situations of companies that classify the items 
in their CFSs in the way that is considered the most correct 
from their viewpoint, independently of the economic-
financial context in which they find themselves, or there 
may be other incentives that influence that choice that 
have not been explored in this research, such as growth 
opportunities, companies under judicial reorganization, 
and the percentage of shares traded on the stock exchange 
in the period, to be analyzed in future research. In addition, 
analysts’ decisions could be considered in future studies, 
in order to provide the perspective of these financial 
statement users in the analysis of CFSs.
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APPENDIX A
Data with occurrences excluded from the sample
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Data inconsistencies
Companhia de Ferro Ligas da Bahia – FERBASA 1 1 2
Cr2 Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. 1 1
Daleth Participações S.A. 1 1
Desenvix Energias Renováveis S.A. 1 1
Fibam Companhia Industrial 1 1
Ideiasnet S.A. 1 1
João Fortes Engenharia S.A. 1 1
Log-In Logística Intermodal S.A. 1 1 2
Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. 1 1
PDG Realty S.A. Empreendimentos e Participações 1 1
Total 1 2 2 3 3 1 12
CFS not presented, illegible, or incomplete
Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. – ELETROBRAS 1 1
Companhia Energética de Pernambuco – CELPE 1 1
Companhia Energética de São Paulo – CESP 1 1
FG Holding International S.A. 1 1
Log-In Logística Intermodal S.A. 1 1
MAHLE Metal Leve S.A. 1 1
Metalúrgica Duque S.A. 1 1
Total 1 3 1 2 7
CFS = Cash Flow Statement.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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APPENDIX B – DATA FROM MODEL A
Data on the variables of model A
Variables Period Mean n Standard deviation Median
Dependent variable
Difference in reais 
between the disclosed 
CFO and encouraged 
CFO divided by the value 
of total assets
2008 0.0081 64 0.05748 0.0000
2009 0.0085 67 0.04024 0.0000
2010 0.0014 70 0.05552 0.0100
2011 0.0140 81 0.03467 0.0200
2012 0.0102 89 0.02659 0.0100
2013 0.0084 108 0.03030 0.0100
2014 -0.0029 106 0.12704 0.0100
Total 0.0065 585 0.06538 0.0100
Profitability
2008 -3.7136 64 43.74277 2.7000
2009 4.9388 67 10.92714 4.0000
2010 4.7869 70 10.16828 4.3000
2011 4.1981 81 8.89029 4.4000
2012 0.3606 89 20.40381 2.8000
2013 -3.7185 108 46.23418 2.8000
2014 72.4019 106 749.50581 3.2000
Total 13.8008 585 320.11134 3.3000
Debt
2008 69.8545 64 79.70254 58.3000
2009 61.8191 67 57.81431 53.4000
2010 64.7869 70 64.15549 55.4000
2011 60.6677 81 43.69228 57.1000
2012 62.5588 89 59.24189 57.0000
2013 64.8224 108 63.80535 54.3500
2014 63.6726 106 51.78391 57.3500
Total 63.8967 585 59.78372 56.2000
Size
2008 13.47 64 2.70 13.78
2009 14.11 67 1.98 14.29
2010 14.50 70 1.90 14.63
2011 14.67 81 1.82 14.71
2012 14.73 89 1.83 14.78
2013 14.82 108 1.66 14.99
2014 14.91 106 1.54 14.99
Total 14.53 585 1.93 14.71
CFO = cash flow from operations.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.










2008 47 (27.5) 17 (9.9) 107 (62.6) 171 (100.0)
2009 55 (32.2) 12 (7.0) 104 (60.8) 171 (100.0)
2010 54 (31.6) 16 (9.4) 101 (59.1) 171 (100.0)
2011 59 (34.5) 22 (12.9) 90 (52.6) 171 (100.0)
2012 74 (43.3) 15 (8.8) 82 (48.0) 171 (100.0)
2013 85 (49.7) 23 (13.5) 63 (36.8) 171 (100.0)
2014 87 (50.9) 19 (11.1) 65 (38.0) 171 (100.0)
Total 461 (38.5) 124 (10.4) 612 (51.1) 1.197 (100.0)
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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APPENDIX C – DATA FROM MODEL B
Data on the variables of model B
Variables Period Mean n Standard deviation Median
Profitability
2008 -4.2227 94 44.82704 3.7500
2009 4.0619 117 14.63133 5.0000
2010 4.7793 162 11.29089 5.4500
2011 4.1024 176 9.35835 4.5000
2012 2.8272 193 9.20505 3.3000
2013 -0.3005 199 34.65555 3.1000
2014 41.5440 200 544.52614 3.3000
Total 9.0878 1,141 228.97491 3.9000
Debt
2008 76.7962 94 75.71170 62.2500
2009 74.9369 117 76.77536 59.8000
2010 62.1357 162 46.13040 57.4400
2011 61.9335 176 44.07944 57.9900
2012 61.1641 193 30.35689 58.9000
2013 63.4889 199 36.79917 57.5000
2014 61.4030 200 24.88416 59.3000
Total 64.5682 1,141 46.83927 58.5000
Size
2008 14.09 94 1.92 14.38
2009 14.18 117 1.83 14.21
2010 14.57 162 1.70 14.59
2011 14.83 176 1.67 14.90
2012 14.95 193 1.56 15.04
2013 15.03 199 1.56 15.12
2014 15.06 200 1.55 15.21
Total 14.76 1,141 1.69 14.90










2008 53 (22.6) 41 (17.5) 140 (59.8) 234 (100.0)
2009 70 (29.9) 47 (20.1) 117 (50.0) 234 (100.0)
2010 101 (43.2) 61 (26.1) 72 (30.8) 234 (100.0)
2011 112 (47.9) 64 (27.4) 58 (24.8) 234 (100.0)
2012 119 (50.9) 74 (31.6) 41 (17.5) 234 (100.0)
2013 125 (53.4) 74 (31.6) 35 (15.0) 234 (100.0)
2014 123 (52.6) 77 (32.9) 34 (14.5) 234 (100.0)










2008 72 (30.8) 22 (9.4) 140 (59.8) 234 (100.0)
2009 100 (42.7) 17 (7.3) 117 (50.0) 234 (100.0)
2010 131 (56.0) 31 (13.2) 72 (30.8) 234 (100.0)
2011 141 (60.3) 35 (15.0) 58 (24.8) 234 (100.0)
2012 158 (67.5) 35 (15.0) 41 (17.5) 234 (100.0)
2013 158 (67.5) 41 (17.5) 35 (15.0) 234 (100.0)
2014 166 (70.9) 34 (14.5) 34 (14.5) 234 (100.0)
Total 926 (56.5) 215 (13.1) 497 (30.4) 1,638 (100.0)
CFF = cash flow from financing activities; CFO = cash flow from operating activities.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
